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Incorporating financial protection into the economic evaluation of 
health technologies 
 
Abstract 
 
The almost universal approach to the economic evaluation of health technologies is to 
compare the cost-effectiveness of treatments, using metrics such as the „cost per quality 
adjusted life year‟. This is based on the reasonable view that a prime objective of the health 
system is to maximize health. However, another fundamental role of universal health 
insurance is to protect citizens from financial catastrophe associated with sickness. Financial 
protection is an especially high priority in many developing countries, but is also returning to 
prominence in high income settings, where policy makers are beginning to question 
sustainability of comprehensive statutory health insurance. This paper develops a simple 
model in which risk averse individuals care about health, but also place a value on protection 
from the financial consequences of rare but costly events. The paper shows how conventional 
cost-effectiveness analysis can readily be augmented to take account of financial protection 
objectives. The results depend on whether or not there exists a market in complementary 
private health insurance. They have important implications for the methodology adopted by 
health technology assessment agencies, and for the broader design of health systems.  
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Incorporating financial protection into the economic evaluation of 
health technologies 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The principal means of financing most mature health systems is a statutory health care 
insurance scheme, covering all citizens whatever their circumstances (Schreyögg et al. 2005). 
The statutory system is funded by some sort of taxation or social insurance, with 
contributions usually according to some measure of income, and unrelated to health status. In 
many countries, the statutory package of care is supplemented by a private health care 
market, funded either by out-of-pocket payments or by voluntary health insurance, with 
financial contributions reflecting actual or expected use of services (Mossialos, and Thomson 
2004).    
 
Most wealthy countries seek to make the statutory package reasonably comprehensive, 
ensuring that all citizens are insured for reimbursement of most mainstream health care 
(albeit sometimes with a modest user copayment).  However, health care is offering rapidly 
increasing opportunities to address sickness and disability, citizens are placing increasing 
demands on their health care systems, and public sources of funds are coming under 
increasing strain. Many commentators claim that there are limits to the extent to which the 
traditional sources of finance for statutory insurance can be exploited. The principle of 
comprehensiveness is therefore coming under strain. In rich countries, the policy questions 
therefore arise: should some interventions be removed from the statutory package; and if so, 
which ones?  
 
In low income countries, there are often limited financial resources available for statutory 
insurance, based on a slender tax base and (sometimes) donor funds.  There is therefore 
usually no attempt to offer comprehensive coverage, and a much heavier reliance is placed on 
personal finance of health care, usually in the form of out-of-pocket payments (Gertler, and 
Van der Gaag 1990).  A key policy question in these circumstances is the extent to which the 
limited statutory system is being deployed to best effect. In many countries there has been a 
persistent concern that the statutory funds available are being deployed on interventions that 
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are not cost-effective, or are not supporting those most in need, namely the sick and the poor 
(Hauck, Smith, and Goddard 2002). 
 
Such concerns have led to an increasingly concerted effort in all types of health system to 
specify explicitly an „essential‟ package of health care that is covered by the statutory 
insurance fund (Jost 2005). The intention is to create a set of interventions to which all 
qualifying citizens have an entitlement when clinical indications are satisfied. 
 
The usual 
assumption is that receipt of care will be free or subject to a small copayment. Of course, the 
scope of the essential package is constrained by the financial resources available to the 
statutory scheme. 
 
Economists have championed the use of the cost-effectiveness ratio as the main criterion for 
selecting interventions for inclusion in the essential package of care (Drummond et al. 1997). 
This policy prescription flows from the notion of maximizing health benefits subject to a 
budget constraint. Cost-effectiveness analysis may therefore be relevant at the margin for 
choosing interventions to exclude from a near-comprehensive statutory package of health 
care. However, the cost-effectiveness criterion may on its own be inappropriate for 
determining the essential package when either equity concerns or private payments play a 
significant role in funding health care (Smith 2005). The purpose of this paper is to identify 
any changes to the optimality criteria that arise when policy makers care about protecting 
individuals from financial catastrophe associated with payments for health services. 
 
The paper is structured as follows.  The next section briefly discusses the relevant academic 
literature on optimality conditions for the size and content of the statutory package.  A 
stylized model of health care is introduced, in which individuals have access to a statutory 
package of health care, but might augment it in the form of out-of-pocket payments or 
complementary private health insurance. The paper then examines the government‟s problem, 
which is to design an optimal statutory (or public) package of insured health care, given the 
known responses of citizens. The paper ends with policy conclusions. 
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THE SIZE AND CONTENT OF THE STATUTORY PACKAGE 
 
There is an economic argument that the prime role of mandatory health insurance is to effect 
a redistribution of wealth from rich to poor, by enabling poor people to secure health 
insurance that they would not otherwise be able to afford. A strict neoclassical economist 
might argue that it – if such a transfer is desired – a more efficient policy than mandatory 
health insurance would be to implement an equivalent wealth redistribution (through the tax 
system) and allow consumers to choose the level and content of their insurance package from 
a competitive market. The imposition of a statutory package merely constrains consumers 
from making their preferred arrangements.  
 
The arguments against such a position are manifest, and include: 
- Market failures in the putative private insurance market, including information 
weaknesses, cream skimming and adverse selection 
- High transaction costs associated with „bespoke‟ insurance markets 
- Moral hazard, in the sense that some citizens may choose not to insure in the belief 
that society will nevertheless offer healthcare if they fall sick (in effect, there may be 
an implicit „safety net‟ package of care available to all) 
- Health care may be a merit good, and it may therefore be easier politically to effect 
the transfer to the poor through provision of benefits in kind (in the form of health 
insurance) than cash transfers. 
Furthermore, the fact that almost all developed countries and an increasing number of lower 
income countries have adopted some sort of mandatory package of health care indicates that 
these and other arguments outweigh the prescriptions of a conventional economic efficiency 
argument. This paper therefore takes as given the need to specify a mandatory package of 
care, and seeks to guide policy makers on the size and nature of this „health basket‟ 
(Schreyögg et al. 2005).  
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It is important to note that the paper makes no judgement on how insurance of the statutory 
package of care is arranged. This might be through local government, national government, 
employer-based social insurance, or competitive social insurance. The only requirements are 
that the insurance arrangement should be mandatory, and that the minimum contents of the 
package to be insured should be specified. Furthermore, I shall assume that premiums must 
be unrelated to sickness levels (community rating). These assumptions do not preclude, for 
example, a competitive market in insurers who compete on price or supplementary contents 
of the insurance package. 
 
In contrast to developed nations, many low income countries rely heavily on user charges as a 
source of finance, and are frequently unable to protect citizens from catastrophic health care 
payments (McPake 1993; Mwabu 2001).  There are numerous adverse consequences of this 
lack of financial protection, from both a macroeconomic and micro perspective (World 
Health Organization 2001). User charges also have a disproportionately adverse impact on 
poor people (Castro-Leal et al. 2000). In principle, therefore, even in the absence of any 
statutory health insurance, some form of private health insurance might offer a Pareto 
improvement over a system of direct user charges. However, there are in practice often no 
trusted institutions in place to manage any insurance function in low income countries. 
Worldwide, pre-payed private insurance accounts for little more than 5% of all health 
expenditure (World Health Organization 2002). In the absence of an insurance function, 
either governmental or non-governmental, citizens must either forego health care, or resort to 
direct out-of-pocket payments.  
 
There is a surprising shortage of relevant theoretical literature on the interaction between user 
charges and the public package of health care. Smith (2005) presents a theoretical model of 
„optimal‟ user charges for specific treatments when there is a limit to the size of the statutory 
package. Hoel (2007) introduces diminishing marginal utility of wealth to determine which 
treatments should be included in a budget-constrained statutory package when the only 
alternative financing is through private out-of-pocket payments. 
 
Private health insurance (alongside a statutory package of care) can take three broad forms: 
substitutive, supplementary or complementary (Mossialos, and Thomson 2004).  Substitutive 
insurance is purchased as an alternative to the statutory insurance, with the implication that 
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those who elect to take out such coverage are at least partially exempt from the premiums or 
taxes associated with the statutory package.   
 
Supplementary private insurance covers services in the statutory package, but insurees 
receive no exemption from payments towards the statutory package, and therefore enjoy 
double coverage.  A market in supplementary insurance implies that it must offer a perceived 
quality advantage over the care secured by the statutory package, perhaps in the form of 
reduced waiting times or access to superior facilities.  In contrast, complementary insurance 
offers full or partial cover for services that are excluded or not fully covered by the statutory 
health care system.  In particular, as in France, it may cover liability for copayments levied 
on services within the statutory package.   
 
There has been a small economic literature on the role of voluntary health insurance 
alongside a publicly-funded „essential‟ package of health care.  Besley (1989) examines the 
extent to which the problem of moral hazard can be abated by augmenting a competitive 
insurance market with publicly funded catastrophic health insurance. The paper stimulated a 
lively academic exchange that is not strictly relevant to the problem addressed in this paper, 
but which does highlight the complexity of formulating mathematical models in this domain, 
and the need for clarity about the assumptions underlying any modelling (Blomqvist, and 
Johansson 1997; Selden 1993).   
 
Petretto (1999) examines the functioning of a publicly insured essential package of care 
alongside a market in private complementary insurance.  The citizen is free to choose the 
insured copayment rate for the complementary services.  Citizens make three contributions to 
health care financing: a tax contribution; a private insurance premium; and the residual 
copayment.  A form of optimal income taxation model is used to analyse the government‟s 
problem, which is to select the optimal statutory copayment rate, in the light of response in 
the private insurance market.  Smith (2006) develops a theoretical model of the optimal 
statutory package in the presence of complementary voluntary health insurance. 
 
There is also a broader public economics literature on the public/private mix.  Blackorby and 
Donaldson (1988) note that the sort of „in kind‟ transfers implied by public insurance may be 
preferred to cash transfers when (as in the case of health care) they are non-tradeable.  In 
contrast to cash transfers, in-kind transfers can ensure that only the intended beneficiaries 
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receive the relevant service.  Munro (1991) examines the implications for optimal taxation 
policy of such transfers.  Ireland (1990) models the integration of in-kind transfers and cash 
transfers, in the form of unconditional payments to the poor, and conditional subsidies of 
private consumption, for example in the form of vouchers.   
 
Epple and Romano (Epple, and Romano 1996a) examine the public/private mix within a 
majority voting model, and find that society‟s choice may depend on the balance of electoral 
power between middle income voters (who prefer higher public provision) and a coalition of 
high and low earners (who prefer lower public provision).  Finally, Besley and Coate (1991) 
note the crucial redistributive function of social provision of private goods.  Providing the 
quality of the social good is not „too high‟, some richer households will - without the need for 
financial compensation - opt out of the social good in order to consume its private 
counterpart, yielding an implicit financial transfer to the poor.  In a similar vein, Blomqvist 
and Horn (1984) examine the transfer from the healthy to the sick implicit in a system of 
statutory insurance in a health care setting. 
 
Little of this literature models the great heterogeneity of services that make up health care, or 
the variations in epidemiology across social groups. It focuses principally on the choice of 
taxation and copayment rates, and does not address a fundamental concern of policy-makers 
– which types of service to include in the essential package. In contrast, this paper builds on 
the work of Smith (2006) and Hoel (2007) to examine the choice of the statutory package 
when the alternative to public provision is private payments, in the form of either out-of-
pocket payments or voluntary private insurance. A further contribution of the paper is to 
model that choice when the epidemiology of disease (and therefore the need for treatment) 
differs between wealth groups and there is a concern with equity. 
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THE MODEL 
 
The approach used in this paper is to model optimal government choices in the light of 
known individual responses to health insurance policy. The individual is risk averse, and 
cares about health and wealth.  The government seeks to maximize a social welfare function 
that incorporates utility and equity concerns. The model therefore incorporates differences 
between wealth groups in (a) underlying health and (b) epidemiology (probability of disease). 
This leads to variations in treatment choices between wealth groups. However, it is not 
necessary to model variability within wealth groups.  
 
There is a set of n health care problems, and for each problem i there is a technology 
available at a known constant price xi. The technologies are assumed to be efficient, in the 
sense that no technology is dominated by any other for the specified condition (these are the 
most cost-effective technologies for each condition). Additional assumptions that are made at 
this preliminary stage are (a) the treatments are additively separable – there are no 
interactions between diseases or treatments (b) the need for treatment i in wealth group y 
occurs with probability πi(y) (though it may not always necessarily be poorer people who 
have higher incidence for all diseases) (c) the expected cost of each treatment (probability 
times xi) is small relative to total expected healthcare expenditure (there is no „lumpiness‟ in 
the health production function) and (d) the health benefits hi of any treatment are equal for all 
groups.  
 
The individual 
 
Adapting the notation of Hoel (2007), I assume that an individual‟s utility is separable in 
wealth and health. If disease i occurs, there is without treatment a known loss of individual 
utility equal to hi that does not differ between individuals, which we can think of as the 
health-related gain of treatment. Without loss of generality, it can be assumed that treatment 
returns an individual to full health. Thus, in the absence of any payment for treatment, utility 
of an individual with wealth y is u(y) and without treatment it is u(y)-hi.  The wealth- related 
utility function u(.) obeys the usual assumptions of diminishing marginal utility. This 
formulation allows the possibility of incorporating into the function u(.) different underlying 
health (such as life expectancy independent of healthcare). However, a limiting assumption in 
this analysis is that healthcare-related utility h is independent of wealth y.  
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In the main text I consider a dichotomy of just „rich‟ and „poor‟ people, designated R and P, 
distributed in proportions ρ and (1- ρ). The continuous wealth measure y is therefore replaced 
by a social group indicator Z. The initial wealth of group Z is indicated by y0
Z
, and the 
expected incidence of disease i by πi
Z
, with the aggregate incidence equal to 
P
i
R
ii  )1(  .  The implications of a larger number of wealth categories or a 
continuous distribution of wealth do not materially affect the results, and are treated briefly in 
the appendix.  
  
 With no statutory health care package, individuals must finance all care privately. Assume 
first that there are no insurance arrangements of any sort, and that the individual must finance 
the treatment out-of-pocket when the need arises. Then, conditional on the need for treatment 
i arising, the health-related gain of treatment is hi and loss in wealth-related utility u(y-xi). So 
the treatment will be purchased if )()( yuxyuh ii  . For each treatment represented by the 
pair (x,h) there is therefore a critical level of wealth ),( hx  at which an individual will be 
indifferent between receiving and rejecting the treatment, such that 
)),(()),(( hxuxhxuh   . 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the locus of pairs (x,h) at which such indifference occurs for a rich and a 
poor wealth group. To the left of the curve, treatment will be purchased, to the right it will be 
rejected. The space of acceptable treatments enjoyed by the poor group is of course smaller 
than the equivalent space for the rich group. The curvature of the locus reflects the 
diminishing marginal utility of wealth (its gradient is yu   at the post-treatment level of 
wealth). Treatments with identical cost effectiveness measures h/x might be accepted if they 
entail low expenditure (and low health gain), whilst rejected if they require higher 
expenditure (even though they yield the same proportionate increase in health gain).  
 
<Figure 1 about here> 
 
Consider now the case when there is still no statutory insurance, but individuals are able to 
purchase private health insurance at an actuarially fair price. For the treatments included in 
the insurance package, this replaces uncertain ex post payments (or denial of treatment) with 
a certain ex ante payment, leading to a welfare gain for risk averse individuals. For an 
11 
 
individual in wealth group Z the optimal insurance package is identified by maximizing 
expected utility: 
 
   







i
i
Z
i
ZZ
i
Z
i
Z xyuh
ii
 0    Maximize  
where the decision variables  n
i
Z
i 1
  are binary variables indicating whether or not insurance 
for the treatment will be purchased by someone in group Z. The amount 
i
i
Z
i
Z x
i
  indicates 
the premium associated with the chosen insurance package. This yields the rule that 
intervention i is included if and only if its cost effectiveness exceeds a threshold: 
y
u
x
h Z
i
i


 . 
where the marginal conditions apply at the wealth of group Z after the relevant premium has 
been paid. That is, the insurance package is based solely on the cost-effectiveness of each 
intervention. Under the assumption of diminishing marginal utility of wealth, the threshold 
decreases with wealth, yielding the obvious result that the rich insure for a more extensive 
healthcare package than the poor.  
 
The impact of voluntary insurance on access to health care is illustrated in Figure 2. The 
person‟s original curve of indifference (between treatment and non-treatment) is shifted from 
OA to OB, because of the wealth loss associated with the payment of the insurance premium. 
However, the individual now receives treatment whenever the cost-effectiveness of the 
treatment lies on or above the line OC, with the slope yu   of the indifference curve at the 
origin. Notice that the individual now secures access to some high cost, high benefit 
treatments that would have been not purchased if payment had been out-of-pocket, indicated 
by the shaded area. However, the loss of wealth associated with the premium may lead to loss 
of access to some treatments with modest cost-effectiveness. 
 
<Figure 2 about here> 
  
Now consider the individual‟s private healthcare decision when there is a statutory package 
of health services, funded from taxation. I assume that the quality of publicly and privately 
purchased treatments are identical, so there is no incentive to purchase privately any 
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treatment that is in the statutory package. The individual must therefore decide whether or not 
to purchase private healthcare not in the statutory package. If private insurance is not 
available, then this decision is taken only when sickness arises, and is modelled simply by 
adapting the out-of-pocket decision discussed above to the situation in which some treatments 
are covered by the statutory package. A treatment not in the package will be purchased out-
of-pocket if )()( 00
ZZZ
i
Z
i tyutxyuh  , where t
Z
  is the tax levied on wealth group Z as a 
contribution to funding the public package.  
 
If private insurance is available, the decision as to whether or not to insure can be modelled 
by comparing expected utility (a) under the mandatory package only, when utility will be a 
function of the expected benefits of the mandatory package and its personal tax cost; and (b) 
supplementing the mandatory package with some private healthcare, when utility will be a 
function of the expected benefits of the combined private and statutory packages, and the 
personal tax cost plus private payments. 
 
The individual makes the choice of private insurance in the knowledge of the government‟s 
chosen package and the associated tax payments needed to finance the package. The status of 
intervention i in the statutory package chosen by the government is indicated by a binary 
variable i , where 1i  if intervention i is in the statutory package, 0i  otherwise. 
Individuals may purchase private healthcare insurance, covering interventions not included in 
the statutory package λ .  As above, the extent of the private package for wealth group Z is 
indicated by the binary choice variables }{ Zi . An individual in wealth group Z will then 
choose a complementary package  n
i
Z
i 1
  so as to: 
   
i
xtyuh
i
Z
i
i
i
Z
i
z
i
i
zz
ii
Z
i
z
i


        1     subject to
)(    Maximize 0


 
 
If private insurance is purchased (some 1Zi ) then the optimality conditions for the selected 
interventions (after the relevant tax and private payments have been paid) are: 
y
u
x
h Z
i
i


  
with equality for the marginal intervention.  In general, an increase in the scope of the 
statutory package will reduce the wealth of all citizens (through the necessary tax 
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contributions t
Z
), thereby in general increasing the threshold for inclusion in the private 
package (and reducing the size of it). 
 
Note that the chosen set of private treatments under different mandatory packages in effect 
specify a reaction function for group Z to any government policy. That is, the vector 
),( ZZ tλrθZ   indicates the response in the voluntary insurance market of social group Z to 
mandatory package λ  and tax t
Z
. The set of response functions acts as a constraint in the 
government‟s optimization problem. 
 
The Government 
 
Having decided to mandate a statutory package of care, the government must decide on the 
extent of the package, the decision rules for including treatments in the package, and how the 
package is to be financed. I assume that there is a social welfare function 
))1(,( PR UUW    that the government wishes to maximize, subject to the constraint that 
the costs of the chosen statutory package must be funded by tax payments by all citizens. 
 
 First assume that there is no private health care of any sort. Then the government‟s problem 
is to choose interventions  n
ii 1
  and taxes Rt  and Pt  for the rich and poor so as to: 
}1,0{
)1(})1({   Subject to
)()1(,)(  Maximize 00

























i
PR
i
i
PR
i
i
PP
ii
P
i
RR
ii
R
ttx
tyuhtyuhW
ii
ii



 
 
First order conditions yield the result that intervention i is selected if and only if: 
 
 
 PiPRiR
i
P
P
iR
R
i
P
i
R
i
i
i
U
W
U
Wx
h




)1(
)1(
)1(















  
where   is the opportunity cost of tax funds and 
ZZ U
W


  is the marginal social value of 
an improvement in utility for group Z.  This equation effectively adjusts   for variations in 
the social importance of the two population groups, reducing the hurdle rate for interventions 
with a high incidence in the poorer group if there is a pro-poor equity concern.  It is 
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consistent with the policy recommendation of adjusting the cost-effectiveness ratios of 
clinical interventions according to their equity implications (Williams, Tsuchiya, and Dolan 
2005).  
 
The tax contributions for each social group Z satisfy the marginal conditions: 





y
u
U
W Z
Z
 or Z
Z
y
u
 /


 
A crucial role of the tax payments is therefore to equalize social marginal utility of wealth 
across social groups. The special case of a linear wealth tax constrains the government‟s 
options for effecting transfers, and the marginality condition becomes: 
 PRP
P
P
R
R
R
yyy
y
u
U
W
y
y
u
U
W
0000 )1()1(  














  
or for many social groups: 






Z
Z
Z
Z
Z
Z
ZZ
yy
y
u
U
W
00  . 
 
Suppose now that out-of-pocket complementary private healthcare is available.  If neither 
wealth group chooses to use private healthcare, the situation remains as just examined (no 
private care).  If both groups choose to use some private care, the marginal conditions are 
those discussed earlier with no statutory insurance, although note there will have been an 
effective cash transfer between groups brought about by the tax contributions.  However, the 
analytically interesting case is when the rich group chooses to insure while the poor group 
does not.  
 
It is worth noting here the implications of including procedure i in the statutory package: 
a) for a poor person, the procedure becomes available, so there is an expected health 
gain πi
R
hi; 
b) for a rich person, there is no need to purchase the treatment out-of-pocket at price xi 
with probability πi
R
; 
c) for both groups, there is an increase in the tax payment, in sum equal to ii x . 
For the marginal procedure, the welfare gains associated with (a) and (b) will be balanced 
against the wealth losses represented by (c).   
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Because the rich would pay out-of-pocket for treatments not included in the package, the 
government‟s optimization problem becomes: 
 
}1,0{
)1(})1({   Subject to
)()1(,)()(  Maximize 000

























i
PR
i
i
PR
i
i
PP
ii
P
i
i
RRRR
i
R
ttx
tyuhxtyutyuW
ii
ii



 
 
The solution for an intervention to be in the statutory package is therefore: 
  iiiPPiiRRRRi xhxtyutyu   )1()()(  
On left hand side, the first expression gives the financial benefits to the rich of not needing to 
pay out of pocket for intervention k if the need arises. The second expression represents the 
health benefits to the poor of including intervention k in the statutory package. The right hand 
side gives the incremental tax cost to both rich and poor of including intervention k in the 
statutory package.   
 
Notice that this rule is analogous to the more conventional cost-effectiveness criterion for 
inclusion in he package, which ranks treatments according to the ratio hi/xi. The difference is 
that wealth benefits  )()( iRR xtyutyu   replacing health benefits hi for richer groups 
who take advantage of private healthcare if the treatment is not included in the statutory 
package. By definition, this expression is less than hi. Relative to the conventional ranking, 
this new rule will therefore favour treatments for diseases of poor people. Furthermore, for 
treatments with the same cost-effectiveness rates hi/xi, it will favour high cost treatments, for 
which the loss of income-related utility   iiRR xxtyutyu /)()(   would be high relative 
to lower cost treatments.  
 
When complementary private insurance is available, the rich now insure some treatments, 
and do not have to rely on out-of-pocket payments for treatments outside the statutory 
package. Assume that the rich choose to insure a package of treatments  n
i
R
i 1
 . The 
government‟s optimization problem is revised to the following: 
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First order conditions for the marginal intervention imply 
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yielding the solution that for an intervention to be in the statutory package: 
y
u
x
h P
i
i


  
 
The policy maker‟s decision rule now becomes straightforward.  The statutory package is 
chosen by a simple ranking of interventions in line with their cost-effectiveness ratios, with 
the cut-off rate being the post-tax preferences of the poor. There is no longer any need to 
consider income-related utility losses arising from out-of-pocket payments. The solution 
differs from the pure „private insurance‟ case only in the sense that, through the existence of 
the statutory package, the poor implicitly receive a tax transfer from the rich, in line with 
social preferences. The implicit threshold for accepting technologies into the insured package 
for the poor has therefore been relaxed compared to the purely private case with no such 
transfers. The rich use the statutory package and secure additional complementary insurance, 
up to the point where for the marginal intervention: 
y
u
x
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i
i

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Although the rich wish to use private insurance, their private package is more constrained 
than under no statutory insurance because the transfer to the poor reduces their wealth, and 
therefore their willingness to pay for private insurance. The benefit/cost ratio remains the 
criterion for selecting both statutory and voluntary package, and the system of combined 
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statutory and voluntary insurance replicates a first best solution to health insurance after a 
socially optimal transfer between wealth groups has been effected.   
 
Thus the main role of the statutory package under these circumstances is to effect a financial 
transfer from rich to poor, allowing the poor access to a broader package of care than would 
otherwise have been the case. It might at first glance be surprising to see no reference to the 
epidemiology of diseases in the choice of statutory package, as it is commonly argued that a 
government concerned with redistribution should concentrate on insuring diseases with high 
prevalence amongst the poor. Indeed, as we showed earlier, this would be the case if there 
was sole reliance on public insurance. However, with complementary private insurance it is 
not necessary. If treatments with relatively high use amongst the rich are included in the 
statutory package (because they are highly cost-effective), then the associated insurance costs 
can be recouped in the taxes levied on the rich.  Health care payments of the rich comprise (a) 
an element of tax required to fund their own part of the statutory package, (b) an element of 
tax required to subsidize the poor‟s part of the statutory package, and (c) the voluntary 
insurance premium.  Elements (a) and (c) merely reflect in aggregate the costs of their 
preferred insurance package.  The real policy choice is the size of (b), the transfer to the poor.   
 
The solution with voluntary health insurance can be illustrated diagrammatically. Figure 3 
shows the health production function for a poor person,constructed by computing the 
cumulative impact on health of all potential interventions, ranked in decreasing order of cost-
effectiveness. With no subsidy, expenditure X0
P
 is chosen.  The implicit subsidy from the rich 
introduced by a statutory insurance package effectively shifts the production function to the 
left by the amount of the subsidy for each poor person.  This leads to a revised expenditure by 
the poor (which is effectively their tax contribution tP).  Total expected expenditure on health 
services for the poor is then X1
P
, with the tax subsidy from the rich being X1
P
-tP.  Both utility 
and health outcome are higher than under no statutory insurance. 
 
<Figure 3 about here> 
 
Figure 4 shows the health production function for a rich person.  With no subsidy, 
expenditure X0
R
 is chosen.  The implicit subsidy to the poor introduced by a statutory 
insurance package shifts the production function to the right by the amount of the subsidy 
paid by each rich person.  This leads to a revised expenditure by the rich TR, comprising the 
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tax contribution tR and any voluntary insurance expenditure.  Total expected expenditure on 
health services for the rich is then X1
R
, with the tax subsidy to the poor being TR-X1
R
.  In 
general, the insurance cover of the rich will comprise a mix of the statutory package and 
some complementary voluntary coverage.  Utility and health outcome are lower than under 
no statutory insurance. 
 
<Figure 4 about here> 
 
For a given statutory package (with voluntary insurance supplement) a rich person can be 
induced to withdraw entirely from the public coverage if paid a suitable transfer yˆ .  The 
minimum value of the transfer is such that utility with statutory plus supplementary insurance 
is equal to utility with purely private insurance plus the transfer, after all taxes and insurance 
premiums have been paid.  In the context of Figure 4, the minimum transfer – a form of 
compensating variation – is calculated by constructing the indifference curve through the 
outcome (X1
R
, H1
R
).  The personal production function is then shifted to the right until 
tangency is secured, the magnitude of the shift indicating the required transfer. 
 
Note that the payment of such transfers would dilute the redistributive role of statutory health 
insurance.  If the rich „opt out‟ of the statutory package, the tax base available for the 
statutory package is reduced.  It will usually be the case that the net tax revenue lost by the 
exit of the richest citizens in the statutory scheme will exceed the reduction in costs 
associated with their statutory health care expenditure liability.  Under these circumstances, 
there will be no equilibrium social provision, and the statutory package is unviable (Ireland 
1990). 
 
Conclusions 
 
This paper seeks to generalize the formulation and solution of a central problem in all health 
systems: how to choose the statutory package of care to which all citizens are given free 
access when objectives include financial protection as well as health improvement. A key 
concern is type of options available and the nature of patients‟ responses when a treatment is 
not covered by such a package. I have modelled three scenarios: no availability of private 
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care; a spot market of private care paid for out-of-pocket; and a market in prepaid 
complementary private insurance.  
 
The paper notes that a first best solution can in principle be secured in a purely private 
insurance market by effecting cash transfers between individuals and allowing them to 
purchase their preferred insurance package. In practice, this approach fails in health care 
because of market failures. However, it can be replicated by a government specifying a 
statutory package in line with redistributional goals, and nurturing a complementary 
voluntary insurance market. Under these circumstances the conventional cost-effectiveness 
ratio is the appropriate decision rule for including treatments in the package. 
 
In many developing and transition economies, however, there exists no sustainable private 
insurance market, and citizens must rely on out-of-pocket purchase for many treatments. A 
policy implication of this analysis is that governments have an important role in stimulating 
and supporting such a market. Even if this is not possible, welfare improvements can be 
secured through the specification of a statutory package of care, in line with redistribution 
and affordability constraints. However, the decision rule for including treatments in such a 
package must be amended so as to favour (a) treatments with high incidence amongst the 
poor and (b) high cost treatments (relative to low cost treatments with identical cost-
effectiveness ratios). 
 
A key assumption in this analysis is that treatments purchased in the public and private 
sectors have identical quality. It is reasonably straightforward to introduce quality variations 
into the analysis, but it should be noted that they lead to inferior welfare results, and may 
even make any public insurance unviable if they lead to resistance amongst rich people to 
funding the statutory package through their taxes. Maintenance of public sector quality is 
therefore a key policy requirement to make these results applicable.  
 
This analysis reinforces the central role of the economic evaluation of health technologies in 
the health system, but indicates a need to adjust methodology depending on the institutional 
setting in which it is undertaken. Further work might examine the implications of relaxing 
some of the assumptions in the analysis, such as variable effectiveness of treatment amongst 
different wealth groups, variable quality, and heterogeneity of health needs within wealth 
groups.
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Appendix: extension to continuous wealth distribution 
 
As in the main text, there is a set of n health care problems, and for each problem i there is a 
technology available at a known constant price xi. Wealth is distributed according to the 
density function f(y). The need for treatment i at wealth level y occurs with probability πi(y). 
Aggregate incidence is given by 


0
)()( dyyfyii  . The health benefits hi of any treatment 
are equal for all groups. Taxes for wealth group y are t(y). Utility is separable in wealth and 
health. 
 
Much of the analysis required with a continuous distribution of wealth requires only a trivial 
notational change. In the absence of insurance, utility without treatment for the condition 
represented by (x,h) is u(y)-hi and with treatment is u(y-xi). There is a critical level of wealth 
),( hx  at which an individual will be indifferent between receiving and rejecting the 
treatment, such that )),(()),(( hxuxhxuh   . 
 
With private insurance, patients include treatments in their private package that are not 
covered publicly, and that satisfy 
y
u
x
h

  at the post-premium level of wealth. 
 
Assume a government interested in maximizing aggregate utility, possibly weighted by 
wealth according to weights w(y). With no private health services, the maximization problem 
is to choose λ and the tax function t(y) so as to: 
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yielding the straightforward result  
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i  . 
That is, treatments are selected up to the threshold μ, possibly weighted for equity. Tax 
contributions satisfy the marginal conditions )(/ ywyu   
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With complementary out-of-pocket health care, and ignoring the equity term w(.), the 
government‟s welfare maximization problem can be written as: 
   
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The three terms in the maximand indicate, respectively, the benefits to all citizens arising 
from inclusion in the statutory package, the health loss to poorer people arising from 
exclusion from the package, and the wealth loss to richer people arising from exclusion. This 
formulation gives rise to the solution: 
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Compared with conventional cost-effectiveness analysis, this indicates that the benefits of 
including a treatment in the statutory package must be amended for wealth-related utility loss 
amongst richer people, which will be less than health gains hi for that group. This rule 
implicitly (a) reduces the weight placed on richer people, so will favour diseases that are 
more prevalent amongst the poor, and (b) increases the weight placed on more expensive 
treatments, for which the value of ),( hx  is low. Inclusion of equity weights is a trivial 
extension. 
 
When there exists the possibility of complementary private insurance a continuous 
distribution of incomes, there is a critical level of wealth ),( hx for each treatment above 
which the treatment will be included in the insurance package. The optimization problem 
now becomes: 
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yielding the solution 
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Figure 1: Indifference between treatment and non-treatment for rich and poor 
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Figure 2: Impact of health insurance on access to treatments 
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Figure 3: Health expenditure by the poor with introduction of a statutory package 
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Figure 4: Health expenditure by the rich with a statutory package 
25 
 
References 
 
 
 
Besley, T. 1989. “Publicly provided disaster insurance for health and the control of moral 
hazard.” Journal of Public Economics 39(2): 141-56. 
Besley, T. and S. Coate. 1991. “Public Provision of Private Goods and the Redistribution of 
Income.” American Economic Review 81(4): 979-84. 
Blackorby, C. and D. Donaldson. 1988. “Cash versus kind, self-selection and efficient 
transfers.” American Economic Review 78(4): 691-700. 
Blomqvist, A. and H. Horn. 1984. “Public health insurance and optimal income taxation.” 
Journal of Public Economics 24(3): 353-71. 
Blomqvist, A. and P. O. Johansson. 1997. “Economic efficiency and mixed public/private 
insurance.” Journal of Public Economics 66(3): 505-16. 
Castro-Leal, F., J. Dayton, L. Demery, and K. Mehra. 2000. “Public spending on health care 
in Africa: do the poor benefit?” Bulletin of the World Health Organization 78(1): 66-74. 
Drummond, M., B. O‟Brien, G. Stoddart, and G. Torrance. 1997. Methods for the Economic 
Evaluation of Health Care Programmes. second edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Epple, D. and R. Romano. 1996a. “Ends against the middle: Determining public service 
provision when there are private alternatives.” Journal of Public Economics 62(3): 297-325. 
Epple, D. and R. Romano. 1996b. “Public Provision of Private Goods.” Journal of Political 
Economy 104(1): 57-84. 
Gertler, P. and J. Van der Gaag. 1990. The willingness to pay for medical care in developing 
countries. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Hauck, K., P. Smith, and M. Goddard. 2002. The economics of priority setting for health: a 
literature review. Washington DC: The World Bank. 
Hoel, M. 2007. “What should (public) insurance cover?” Journal of Health Economics 26: 
251-62. 
Ireland, N. 1990. “The mix of social and private provision of goods and services.” Journal of 
Public Economics 43(2): 201-19. 
Jost, T. 2005. “Health care coverage determinations.” Maidenhead: Open University Press. 
McPake, B. 1993. “User charges for health services in developing countries: a review of the 
economic literature.” Social Science & Medicine 36(11): 1397-405. 
Mossialos, E. and S. Thomson. 2004. “Voluntary health insurance in the European Union.” 
Brussels: World Health Organization. 
Munro, A. 1991. “The optimal public provision of private goods.” Journal of Public 
Economics 44(2): 239-61. 
Mwabu, G. 2001. “User charges for health care: a review of the underlying theory and 
assumptions.” In Social Provision in Low-Income Countries - New Patterns and Emerging 
Trends, edited by G. Mwabu, C. Ugaz, and G. White. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Petretto, A. 1999. “Optimal social health insurance with supplementary private insurance.” 
Journal of Health Economics 18(6): 727-45. 
Schreyögg, J., T. Stargardt, M. Velasco-Garrido, and R. Busse. 2005. “Defining the „Health 
Benefit Basket‟ in nine European countries.” European Journal of Health Economics 6(Suppl 
1): 2-10. 
Selden, T. M. 1993. “Should the Government Provide Catastrophic Insurance.” Journal of 
Public Economics 51(2): 241-47. 
Smith, P. 2005. “User charges and priority setting in health care: balancing equity and 
efficiency.” Journal of Health Economics 24: 1018-29. 
26 
 
Smith, P. 2006. “Public packages of health care alongside voluntary insurance.” In Private 
Voluntary Health Insurance in Development: Friend or Foe?, edited by A. Preker, R. M. 
Scheffler, and M. Bassett. Washington DC: World Bank. 
Williams, A., A. Tsuchiya, and P. Dolan. 2005. “Eliciting equity-efficiency trade-offs in 
health.” In Health policy and economics: opportunities and challenges, edited by P. Smith, L. 
Ginnelly, and M. Sculpher. Maidenhead: Open University Press. 
World Health Organization. 2001. Macroeconomics and Health: Investing in Health for 
Economic Development.  Report of the Commission on Macroeconomics and Health. 
Geneva: World Health Organization. 
World Health Organization. 2002. World Health Report 2002: reducing risks, promoting 
healthy life. Geneva: World Health Organization. 
 
 
  
www.imperial.ac.uk/business-school 
Imperial College Business School 
Tanaka Building 
South Kensington Campus 
London SW7 2AZ 
United Kingdom 
 
T: +44 (0)20 7589 5111 
F: +44 (0)20 7594 9184 
This paper has been produced by the Healthcare Management Group  
at Imperial College Business School 
  
Copyright © the authors 2010   
All rights reserved 
ISSN: 1744-6783 
